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Abstract
This article uses cross-sectional data from the Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) database to 
test the effect of both long-term care (LTC) public benefits and insurance on the receipt of informal care provided by family 
members living outside the household in Italy and Spain. The choice of Italy and Spain comes from the fact that informal 
care is rather similar in these two countries while their respective public LTC financing systems are different. Our results 
support the hypothesis of LTC public support decreasing the receipt of informal care for Spain while reject it for Italy. 
They tend to confirm that the effect of public benefits on informal care depends on the typology of public coverage for LTC 
whereby access to proportional benefits negatively influences informal care receipt while access to cash benefits exerts a 
positive effect. Our results also suggest that private LTC insurance complements the public LTC financing system in place.
Keywords Long-term care · Public benefits · Insurance · Informal care
JEL Classification G22 · I11 · J14
Introduction
The ageing of populations in most industrialised countries 
is accompanied by an increase in the needs for long-term 
care1 (LTC). Informal caregivers, mainly relatives or fam-
ily members, and in particular children, meet a large part 
of LTC needs [1]. Informal care, therefore, contributes to 
attenuate LTC expenditures’ increases. However, providing 
informal care could also be detrimental for the caregiver’s 
physical and mental health and employment participation [2, 
3]. Thus, better understanding the determinants of informal 
care is crucial in designing LTC financing programmes. Sev-
eral factors, such as the degree of dependency, the number 
of children, family disintegration, geographical remoteness, 
women’s work, fertility rates and the amount of inheritance, 
can influence the amount and the organization of informal 
help [4].
The availability of public and private LTC financing can 
also influence informal care. In that respect, public LTC sup-
port has mainly been shown to decrease informal care. For 
instance, Ettner [5], Pezzin et al. [6] and Stabile et al. [7], 
using North American surveys and experimental data, show 
that increased availability of publicly financed home care is 
associated with an increase in its utilization and a decline 
in informal caregiving. However, this hypothesis has been 
questioned by Motel-Klingebiel et al. [8], who show that the 
extent to which older people rely on family help is independ-
ent of the welfare estate regime in which they live.
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The availability of private LTC insurance has also been 
discussed as potentially reducing informal care. This phe-
nomenon, first introduced by Pauly [9] and labelled intra-
family moral hazard, refers to the disincentive of informal 
caregivers to provide care, because their dependent elderly 
has insurance coverage against formal LTC costs. It occurs 
as LTC insurance protects the parent’s bequest from the costs 
of formal care in case of dependency, thus weakening the 
child’s main incentive to provide care. Naturally, the same 
analysis can also be transposed to public LTC benefits as 
stressed by Zweifel and Strüwe [10].
Various elements need to be taken into account when 
addressing the effect of LTC coverage on informal care. The 
first one being the relationship between formal and informal 
care as addressed by Ettner [5], Pezzin et al. [6] and Sta-
bile et al. [7]. If formal and informal care are substitutes, 
the availability of subsidised formal care should decrease 
informal care. Nevertheless, the strength of such substitut-
ability depends on the degree of dependency and on the type 
of home care considered [11]. Indeed, for severe levels of 
dependency and high-skilled home care, formal and informal 
care seem to be complements rather than substitutes [12].
A second element that might drive the effect of LTC 
financing availability on informal care is the nature of LTC 
benefits. In that respect, Klimaviciute [13] has theoretically 
shown that intra-family moral hazard is attenuated when 
insurance benefits are fixed and not proportional to LTC 
expenses. The intuition being that with proportional insur-
ance benefits, benefits are received only if formal care is 
consumed, while fixed benefits do not depend on formal care 
consumption. Implicitly, proportional benefits protect more 
the parent’s bequest from the costs of formal care than fixed 
benefits. The same reasoning could apply to public LTC ben-
efits being either in kind, i.e. rather proportional as received 
conditionally on the receipt of formal care, or in the form of 
cash allowances, i.e. rather fixed.
A third element that could influence the link between 
LTC coverage and informal care is linked to the motives for 
providing informal care. In particular, apart from the bequest 
protection motive, informal care can also be provided for 
altruistic reasons or as a moral obligation [14]. In the case of 
altruistic caregivers, Courbage and Eeckoudt [15] and Bas-
cans et al. [16] show that more LTC insurance could even 
increase optimal informal care provision, questioning the 
existence of a negative effect of insurance on informal care. 
As for the moral obligation motive, the potential negative 
effect of insurance on informal care could also be attenuated 
if caregivers have the feeling they are compelled to take care 
of their dependent relatives.
The aim of this paper is to investigate empirically the 
impact of LTC public benefits and LTC insurance owner-
ship on the receipt of informal care by dependent individu-
als. This article looks at this issue in Italy and Spain using 
data from the Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement 
in Europe (SHARE) database which deals with the health, 
lifestyle and financial situation of individuals aged 50 and 
over in the majority of European countries. We restrict our 
analysis to care provided by family members living outside 
the household, excluding help provided by co-resident rela-
tives and other caregivers such as neighbours and friends, 
which has been shown to be much less sensitive to public 
and private support [17, 18]. Thus, even if omitted caregiv-
ers represent a significant source of informal care, their 
inclusion into the analysis would come at the cost of a large 
increase in our estimates’ heterogeneity.
The choice of Italy and Spain stems from the fact that 
informal care is rather similar in these two countries while 
their respective public LTC financing systems are rather 
different. Indeed, sociologists such as Reher [19] suggest a 
division between Southern Europe “strong family ties” and 
Northern Europe “weak family ties” countries. The moral 
obligation motive for caregiving is central in “strong family 
ties” countries, given that in Southern Europe and in Latin-
speaking communities, as opposed to Northern European 
countries, much of the help given to dependent people is 
expected to come from the family [20, 21]. However, the 
nature of public LTC benefits is different in the two coun-
tries, proportional to LTC expenses in Spain and mainly 
in form of cash benefits in Italy. Hence, by studying two 
relatively similar countries in terms of values and family 
ties, cultural heterogeneity tends to disappear, allowing us 
to focus on whether the typology of LTC coverage plays a 
role in influencing the receipt of informal care. In addition, 
according to Motel-Klingeibel et al. [8], another source of 
heterogeneity between welfare regimes could come from dif-
ferences in the development of welfare services. By selecting 
Italy and Spain, which have similar ratios of LTC public 
spending as a percentage of GDP [22], we aim to control 
also for this second source of heterogeneity.
Our results show that in Spain individuals having access 
to public LTC benefits are less likely to receive informal 
care by non-co-resident relatives than those individuals who 
do not benefit from public LTC support. The opposite is 
found for Italy. Our findings tend to confirm that the effect 
of public benefits on informal care depends on the typology 
of public coverage for LTC whereby access to proportional 
benefits negatively influences informal care receipt while 
access to cash benefits exerts a positive effect. Our results 
also show that private LTC insurance is positively related 
to the receipt of informal care provided by family mem-
bers living outside the household in Italy and negatively in 
Spain even if these results are not always significant at the 
usual confidence levels. Hence, private LTC insurance seems 
to complement the public LTC financing system in place, 
explaining why the direction of the marginal effect of private 
LTC insurance on informal care follows the one of public 
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LTC support. Such results can be highly relevant in terms of 
LTC financing policies.
The article is organised as follows. In Section “LTC 
financing in Italy and Spain”, we present briefly the 
ways LTC financing is organised in Italy and Spain. Sec-
tion “Available data and variables” describes the database 
and the variables used. The econometric analysis and the 
results are presented in Section “Econometric analysis”. 
Section “Robustness” consists of robustness checks of the 
results of Section “Econometric analysis”. The final section 
offers a conclusion.
LTC financing in Italy and Spain
LTC risk coverage in Italy
In Italy, the cost and design of public LTC-related services is 
highly fragmented and is shared simultaneously between the 
State, the regions, and the municipalities [23]. Cash benefits 
are the most important pillar of the Italian LTC public inter-
vention in terms of expenditure and number of older people 
affected [23]. The main cash benefit, established by the law 
of 11 February 1980 [24], is the indennità di accompagna-
mento made available by the Social Security in the whole 
country to severely disabled people needing the permanent 
help of a relative to carry out the activities of daily living. 
There exist also some cash benefits provided by the regions, 
provinces and municipalities [25]. Public home help for per-
sonal care and domestic tasks as well as institutional care are 
managed by municipalities in coordination with the National 
Health Service.
Whereas health care services for elderly are free of charge 
in Italy, public home help for personal care and domestic 
tasks is means-tested and users can pay up to its full cost. 
There is a wide variation in the co-payment modalities as 
they are defined by municipalities [25]. The indennità di 
accompagnamento is universal and not means-tested and 
was set at €508 per month in 2015 independently of the 
age and place of residence of the recipient. It was granted 
to 363,868 individuals at the end of 2015 [26]. This cash 
benefit, which was initially thought as a measure to support 
informal caregivers, now serves as well to remunerate pri-
vate home help, in particular help given by migrant workers 
[23].
To be declared eligible for the indennità di accompagna-
mento, an individual needs to be assessed by a health com-
mission in a specialized centre or clinic after an appropriate 
period of observation or hospitalization [27] as 100% disa-
bled and dependent, i.e. in need of continuous assistance or 
unable to walk without the permanent help of a relative. For 
other regional and municipal LTC services and cash benefits, 
eligibility criteria are not homogeneous, and each region 
has a specific dependency classification system taking into 
account mainly activities of daily living (ADL) limitations 
and to a lower extent instrumental activities of daily living 
(IADL) limitations [25].
Finally, the private LTC insurance market is rather thin 
in Italy [28]. Some insurance companies offer private LTC 
coverage, with products consisting of a life annuity in case 
of permanent or full dependency.
LTC risk coverage in Spain
In Spain, the regions and the municipalities offer universal 
LTC public coverage following the 39/2006 Law [29]. The 
prestaciones y servicios para la autonomía y la dependen-
cia, i.e. the dependency benefits and services, are granted to 
all individuals recognized as dependent regardless of their 
age, geographical location and financial situation. This sub-
sidy can be either in kind in the form of formal care or finan-
cial as a percentage of formal care cost. According to the 
law, in kind subsidies have priority over the financial ones. 
In kind formal care can be provided at home, in nursing 
homes and in so called “day” or “night” centres. Financial 
subsidies can only be used to purchase formal LTC (if pub-
licly provided LTC is not available) or to purchase specific 
personal assistance services.2 In 2015, 745′720 individuals 
received the prestaciones y servicios para la autonomía y 
la dependencia, either as in kind or financial subsidies [31].
The system is financed via general taxation and means-
tested co-payments of the users. The average co-payment is 
estimated to be €304, €412 and €662 per month for mod-
erately, severely and major dependent respectively, which 
represents about 50% of the total cost [32]. The assessment 
of users’ participation to the total cost of LTC is complex 
due to regional heterogeneity [32, 33].
Severity of dependency is evaluated by a socio-medical 
team following a visit and an interview at the place of resi-
dence of the person applying for public benefits. The evalua-
tion tool is a unified scale that has been approved in 2011 by 
the Spanish government under the Royal Decree 174/2011 
[34]. To be eligible to public services and subsidies, an indi-
vidual has to be declared at least as moderately dependent, 
i.e. needing help to perform several ADL at least once a day 
or needing limited or not continuous help to be autonomous. 
Initially, only individuals recognised with major and severe 
dependency were covered by the public LTC system and it 
was not until mid-2015 that moderately dependent individu-
als became eligible to public coverage [31].
Finally, in Spain, the private LTC insurance market is 
rather small with 37,225 insured in 2015 [35]. However, 
2 Exceptionally, these services can also be offered by family mem-
bers living in the same household as the dependent elderly [30].
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the market is quite dynamic and shows high growth rates. 
Between 2012 and 2015, the number of insured experienced 
a growth rate of 29%, probably due to a low starting point 
[36]. Private insurance benefits can be either in the form of a 
pre-determined lump-sum or in the form of an annuity. Their 
eligibility criteria are tighter than the public ones, as private 
companies only recognize severe dependency corresponding 
to individuals needing a very high or permanent amount of 
support to stay autonomous.
We summarize the main characteristics of the Italian and 
Spanish LTC financing systems in Table 1.
Available data and variables
Data
We use the SHARE database to empirically study the 
effect of both public support and private LTC insurance 
ownership on the receipt of informal care in both Italy and 
Spain. SHARE is a multidisciplinary, longitudinal and 
cross-national micro-database containing information on 
health-related variables, labour market variables, economic 
variables and other variables (including education, hous-
ing, social support and family structure) of a representa-
tive sample of European individuals aged 50 years or older 
and their spouses. The first wave of SHARE was released 
in 2004. SHARE follows the design of the U.S. Health and 
Retirement study and the English Longitudinal Study of 
Ageing. For more details on the survey, readers should refer 
to Börsch-Supan and Jürges [37].
For the purpose of our study, we use data from the sixth 
wave of the SHARE database. The fieldwork of the sixth 
wave was completed in 2015, released in 2017 and contains 
information about 68,231 individuals from 18 different 
European countries. We discard the use of data from other 
waves as the Spanish public LTC system was not fully in 
place until mid-2015.
The subset of SHARE regarding Italy and Spain con-
tains 10,949 observations, 5313 corresponding to Italy 
and 5636 to Spain. A restriction to individuals having at 
least one mobility, ADL or IADL limitation leaves us with 
5097 observations, 2417 from Italy and 2680 from Spain. 
In addition, due to missing values for some variables, 236 
and 336 observations are lost in the Italian and Spanish sam-
ples, respectively (19, respectively, 10 are lost for missing 
information on limitations). Thus, our final sample includes 
4525 observations, 2181 corresponding to Italy and 2344 to 
Spain. Finally, for models including the control variables 
Net wealth and Regional dummies, additional missing val-
ues leave us with a total of 3760 and 3932 observations, 
respectively. Ta
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The variables
In this section, we present the variables used in our analysis, 
in particular, informal care receipt and LTC coverage, along 
with their descriptive statistics.
Informal care receipt
In SHARE, individuals are asked if any family member, 
friend or neighbour from outside or inside their household 
gave help to them and from whom they were given care. 
Additionally, respondents receiving care from outside the 
household can indicate what type of help they received, and 
more specifically, whether the help received was in the form 
of personal care (e.g., dressing, bathing, getting out of bed), 
practical household help (e.g., home repairs, transportation, 
shopping), or help with paper work (e.g., filling out forms, 
setting financial or legal matters). Interviewed individuals 
are allowed to declare having received any combination of 
these three types of help simultaneously.
Based on these answers, we generate three categories of 
informal care which are informal care in general (simply 
denoted informal care), informal care for ADL and informal 
care for IADL, as shown in Table 2. The first category of 
informal care includes those individuals declaring that they 
received at least one type of help amongst help with personal 
care, practical household help, and help with paperwork. In 
informal care for ADL, we include those individuals declar-
ing having received help with personal care. The informal 
care for IADL group encompasses those declaring having 
received practical household help or help with paperwork.
Table 2 summarizes for both Italy and Spain whether 
individuals receive help or not in our sample, the identity 
of their main caregiver and the type of care they receive by 
individuals living outside their household.
In both countries, around 27% of the interviewed declare 
to receive informal care. In Italy, 21% of the sample declares 
to receive informal care from outside the household and an 
8.5% from inside. In Spain, these rates represent a 19% and 
a 12% of the sample, respectively. Some individuals receive 
simultaneously both types of care in our sample. Indeed, 
the sum of those respondents receiving informal care from 
outside and inside the household exceeds in both countries 
the number of individuals receiving informal care in general.
Family members from outside the household play a domi-
nant role in providing care, supplying around 60% of total 
informal care in both countries (347 observations from 580 
in Italy and 402 from 638 in Spain). Additionally, in Italy 
and Spain, more than 90% of those respondents who receive 
help from outside the household receive it as care for IADL 
(i.e. 424 respondents over 451 in Italy and 416 over 449 in 
Spain). Nevertheless, informal care for ADL plays also an 
important role, representing 36% (163 over 451) of the total 
amount of care received from non-co-resident in Italy and 
Table 2  Informal care from 
outside the household by 
country
The significance levels of the two-tailed Welch’s t test for difference in means are coded as follows: *sig-
nificance at 10% level, **significance at 5% level, ***significance at 1% level
Number of obser-
vations
% of N
Italy Spain Italy (%) Spain (%) Difference (%)
Size of the sample (N) 2181 2344 100 100 –
Receipt of help
 Total 580 638 26.59 27.22 −0.63
 Outside the household 451 449 20.68 19.16 1.52
 Inside the household 185 287 8.48 12.24 −3.76∗∗∗
Caregiver’s identity
 Family member, outside household 347 402 15.91 17.15 −1.24
 Other, outside household 104 47 4.77 2.01 2.76∗∗∗
 Family member, inside household 177 269 8.12 11.48 − 3.36∗∗∗
 Other, inside household 8 18 0.37 0.77 −0.40
Informal care from outside the house-
hold by type and caregiver
 Informal care for IADL 424 416 19.44 17.75 1.69
 Family member 325 372 14.90 15.87 −0.97
 Other 99 44 4.54 1.88 2.66∗∗∗
 Informal care for ADL 163 209 7.48 8.91 −1.43∗
 Family member 138 193 6.33 8.23 −1.90∗∗
 Other 25 16 1.15 0.68 0.47
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47% (209 over 449) in Spain. A substantial number of indi-
viduals declare receiving both, help with ADL and IADL 
simultaneously. Concerning informal care provided by co-
resident caregivers, we do not know, unfortunately, exactly 
its type, even if from the phrasing of the question identifying 
these caregivers in SHARE we can think that they provide 
help with ADL only or both types of help simultaneously.3
In both countries, help with ADL from outside the house-
hold and care from inside the household is almost exclu-
sively provided by family members. Neighbours and friends 
provide, mainly, only care for IADL and thus, seem to sup-
port a lower caregiving burden. From Table 2, we also see 
that despite the existence of important differences between 
the Italian and Spanish public LTC financing systems, the 
differences between both samples concerning informal care 
are rather weak. The main differences, significant at the 1% 
level, concern caregiving by non-family members, which 
is significantly more present in Italy, and caregiving from 
inside the household, which is more common in Spain.
In the econometric analysis, we examine the effect of 
public LTC benefits and insurance on informal care receipt 
provided by relatives living outside the household. Our 
dependent variable accounts, thus, for around 60% of all 
informal care received by respondents. Help received by 
co-resident relatives and other caregivers is excluded and 
categorized as a zero, since pooling all informal care in a 
single item would result in a highly heterogeneous depend-
ent variable. This occurs on two grounds. First, because 
it seems reasonable to expect that informal care provided 
inside the household, mainly by spouses, is much less sensi-
tive to public and private LTC coverage than other forms of 
informal care [17]. Second, because compared to relatives, 
neighbours and friends perform other tasks, have different 
motives to provide care and their role seems to be comple-
mentary to that of spouses and children [18].
We also decided to treat informal care for ADL and IADL 
as two separate dependent variables in the econometric anal-
ysis. The reason is that they could be provided for different 
reasons. As shown by Bonsang [12], Van Houtven and Nor-
ton [38] and Bolin [11], informal care is rather a substitute 
of less intensive formal care such as help with IADL, but 
can be a complement to more intensive care such as personal 
home care. Thus, both types of care could be influenced to a 
different extent by public LTC support and insurance.
LTC coverage
In the survey, individuals are further asked to declare if they 
own public, private voluntary or private mandatory LTC 
insurance, or no coverage at all. Public LTC insurance cor-
responds to insurance or financing provided by the State. 
Despite the terminology in SHARE, public LTC financing 
in Italy and Spain does not correspond strictly to a public 
LTC insurance scheme but to public benefits as indicated in 
Section “LTC financing in Italy and Spain”. Private man-
datory LTC insurance corresponds mainly to private group 
insurance provided through the employer while private vol-
untary LTC insurance corresponds to voluntary supplemen-
tary or complementary individual insurance. Table 3 reports 
how individuals in our sample are covered for LTC-related 
expenses.
With regard to the types of LTC coverage, we note that 
the sum of public, private voluntary and private mandatory 
coverage can exceed the total number of observations of 
those owning LTC coverage. This arises as the same indi-
vidual can have multiple types of coverage at the same time, 
e.g. public benefits and private voluntary insurance.
Table 3  LTC coverage by 
country
The significance levels of the two-tailed Welch’s t-test for difference in means are coded as follows: *sig-
nificance at 10% level, **significance at 5% level, ***significance at 1% level
Number of observa-
tions
% of the total N
Italy Spain Italy (%) Spain (%) Difference (%)
Size of the sample (N) 2181 2344 100 100 –
LTC coverage
 Does not own LTC coverage 1834 1648 84.09 71.84 12.25∗∗∗
 Owns LTC coverage 347 660 15.91 28.16 12.25∗∗∗
Type of LTC coverage
 Public 313 596 14.35 25.43 −11.08∗∗∗
 Private mandatory insurance 6 20 0.28 0.85 −0.58∗∗∗
 Private voluntary insurance 31 65 1.42 2.77 −1.35∗∗∗
3 The original question in SHARE reads as “Is there someone living 
in this household who has helped you regularly during the last twelve 
months with personal care, such as washing, getting out of bed, or 
dressing?”.
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In both countries, LTC coverage is mainly provided by 
the State. In Italy, 14% of the respondents in our sample 
report having public LTC coverage, and very few report 
being covered with private voluntary or mandatory LTC 
insurance. In Spain, the proportion of those receiving public 
LTC benefits is higher than in Italy with around 25% of the 
sample declaring being covered by the public system while 
the number of individuals owning private LTC insurance is 
much lower and represents around 3% of the total.
One explanation of such discrepancy in public LTC cov-
erage between the two countries could come from eligibility 
criteria. In Italy, the main LTC benefit (i.e. the indennità 
d’accompagnamento) is only attributed to severely depend-
ent individuals, while in Spain, eligibility to public LTC 
benefits also includes moderately dependent individuals. 
The large share of individuals not having any financial LTC 
coverage in both countries could be explained, in addi-
tion to eligibility criteria, by the belief that care should be 
exclusively a matter of the family, by insufficient informa-
tion about public LTC programs, by the complexity of the 
application process to public LTC or by the presence of co-
payments, among others.
Other variables
In the econometric analysis, we control the effect of public 
LTC coverage and LTC insurance on informal care receipt 
with a series of additional variables.
First, we consider the effect of formal home care utili-
sation on informal care. We use formal care utilisation as 
a control variable, because our objective is to investigate 
whether public benefits and private insurance, and not the 
receipt of formal care, provides incentives or disincentives to 
informal care. Additionally, formal care availability, which 
can be proxied by formal care use, could be simultane-
ously correlated with public LTC support take-up, private 
LTC insurance ownership and informal care. We define the 
variable formal care as indicating if the individual received 
home help with personal care (e.g. dressing, eating or using 
the toilet), domestic tasks (e.g. cleaning, ironing, cooking, 
meals-on-wheels) or other activities such as filling a drug 
dispenser by paid professional workers during the previous 
12 months. Following Bolin et al. [11], we also consider 
highly qualified health care in the form of a binary variable 
indicating whether the respondent has been in a hospital 
overnight during the last year and on the number of the inter-
viewee’s visits to a doctor during the previous 12 months. 
We separately treat formal home care and health care as their 
relationship with informal care might be different according 
to the literature [11].
The respondent’s degree of dependency is included as 
a control since it is the most important driver of informal 
care provision according to the literature [18]. Following 
Courbage and Roudaut [39], the level of dependency can 
be defined through the self-reported number of limitations 
the individual has with a set of movements (walking 100 m, 
sitting for 2 h, etc.), ADL (dressing, using the toilet, bathing, 
etc.) and IADL (phoning, using a map, taking medicines, 
etc.). The respondent’s self-reported health is also consid-
ered, since it can also be an important determinant of infor-
mal care besides its positive correlation with the severity of 
dependency.
As the family structure is very likely to simultaneously 
affect the supply of informal care and the decision to pur-
chase voluntary LTC insurance [38, 40], we consider a large 
set of controls describing the respondent’s household and 
family composition. We include the number of members 
living in the respondent’s household and his/her number of 
children, as well as a set of binary variables such as being 
married, widow, having a co-resident child, and having a 
daughter.
We include three classical demographic controls, i.e. 
the respondent’s gender, age, and whether he/she lives in 
an urban area or not. Finally, we also include net wealth 
(including housing assets) and a binary variable for whether 
the interviewee has given a material or financial gift larger 
than 250€. This is done to control for a possible omitted 
variable bias as wealth and financial gifts are likely to be 
simultaneously correlated with informal care (i.e. if bequest 
or exchange motives for providing care are present), pub-
lic LTC benefits eligibility (via means-tested co-payments) 
and private LTC insurance purchase. We do not to include 
income, education and employment situation as controls 
since most individuals of the sample have left the labour 
market. Lastly, we include for Spain a binary variable indi-
cating if the interview was performed in Catalan as cultural 
and institutional differences between the Catalan-speaking 
population and the rest of Spaniards, simultaneously affect-
ing informal care receipt and LTC insurance ownership, are 
likely to be present in our dataset.
Descriptive statistics
Table 4 provides a summary and description of the set of 
variables considered in the econometric models. Sample 
mean values are reported separately for Italy and Spain.
There is a significant overlap on the dependent variables 
Informal care and Informal care for IADL, as more than 90% 
of those who receive help by family members living outside 
the household receive it as care for IADL. While SHARE 
distinguishes private mandatory and voluntary LTC insur-
ance, we merge them into one type of private insurance (var-
iable LTCI private) to work with a variable maximizing the 
number of individuals privately covered. The informal care 
and insurance related variables’ sample means reflect the 
trends commented earlier in Sections “Informal care receipt” 
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and “LTC coverage”. Additionally, Italians are less likely 
to receive formal home care when compared to Spaniards 
which is consistent with the observed differences in public 
LTC coverage. In both countries the average household is 
composed of 2.2 members and surveyed individuals have on 
average about 2 children. Roughly 63% of the individuals are 
married, around 18% are widow and between 20 and 25% of 
respondents live with their children.
Econometric analysis
Econometric specification
In our econometric analysis, we run three probit models on 
the three binary variables defining informal care provided by 
family members from outside the household (see Table 4). 
This type of regression is suited when the dependent variable 
Table 4  Variables’ description and sample means
Number of observations: 2181 in Italy and 2344 in Spain (with the exception of the variable Net wealth)
The significance levels of the Welch two-tailed t test for difference in means are coded as: *significance at 10% level, **significance at 5% level, 
***significance at 1% level
Variable Description Italy Spain Difference
Dependent variables
 Informal care 1 if having received at least one type of help amongst help with personal care, prac-
tical household help, and help with paperwork by a family member from outside 
the household
0.159 0.172 −0.013
 Informal care for ADL 1 if having received help with personal care (dressing, eating, using the toilet…) by 
a family member from outside the household
0.063 0.082 − 0.019∗∗
 Informal care for IADL 1 if having received practical household help (gardening, shopping…) or help with 
paperwork such as filling out forms by a family member from outside the house-
hold
0.149 0.159 −0.010
Independent variables
 LTCI public 1 if reporting to own LTC insurance or financing provided by the State 0.144 0.254 − 0.110∗∗∗
 LTCI private 1 if reporting to own private mandatory or voluntary / supplementary LTC insur-
ance
0.017 0.036 − 0.019∗∗∗
 Formal care 1 if having received professional or paid personal care, help with domestic tasks or 
help with other activities such as filling a drug dispenser during the last year
0.116 0.172 −0.056∗∗∗
 Hospital 1 if having been in a hospital overnight during the last 12 months 0.177 0.202 −0.025∗∗
 Doctor Number of doctor visits during the last year 11.950 8.337 3.613∗∗∗
 Mobility limitations Number of mobility limitations (walking 100 m, sitting for 2 h, climbing stairs…) 3.364 3.958 −0.594∗∗∗
 ADL limitations Number of limitations in Activities of Daily living (getting in / out of bed, bathing 
or showering…)
0.529 0.682 −0.153∗∗∗
 IADL limitations Number of limitations in Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (phoning, personal 
laundry…)
1.059 1.529− 0.470∗∗∗
 Health Respondent’s self-reported health 2.214 2.103 0.111∗∗
 Household members Number of people living in the respondent’s household, excluding lodgers 2.263 2.224 0.039
 Married 1 if reporting to be married or in a registered partnership 0.644 0.626 0.018
 Widow 1 if reporting to be widow 0.165 0.191 − 0.026∗∗
 N children Interviewee’s number of living children 1.997 2.264 − 0.267∗∗∗
 Co-resident children 1 if reporting to have a child living in the same household 0.251 0.190 0.061∗∗∗
 Has daughter 1 if reporting to have at least one living daughter 0.630 0.668− 0.038∗∗∗
 Care other 1 if having received informal care by a neighbour or a friend from outside the 
household
0.048 0.020 0.028∗∗∗
 Care inside 1 if having received informal care by somebody from inside the household 0.085 0.122 − 0.037∗∗∗
 Age Interviewee’s age 70.712 74.331 −3.619∗∗∗
 Female 1 if the interviewee is a woman 0.628 0.613 0.015
 Urban 1 if the interviewee lives in a big city, the suburbs or outskirts of a big city or a 
small town
0.341 0.419− 0.078∗∗∗
 Net wealth (in €) Self-reported net wealth, in euro 200, 423 205, 396 − 4972
 Gift 1 if the interviewee has given any material or financial gift of 250€ or more in the 
last 12 months
0.296 0.096 0.200∗∗∗
 Catalan 1 if interviewed in Catalan (Spain) – 0.167 –
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takes only two values. More formally, for each country, we 
model an individual’s probability of receiving informal care 
by the following equation:
where ICj
i
 with j = 1, 2, 3 corresponds to the three dummy 
variables defining informal care in an aggregate way (j = 1), 
for ADL (j = 2) and for IADL (j = 3). While the superscript j 
is linked to the three regressions, the subscript i is linked to 
the observations, i.e. the responses from the surveyed indi-
viduals. LTCi refers to the two variables defining public and 
private LTC financing and Xi to the independent variables 
in Table 4 selected as control variables. Assuming the error 
term 휀i is normally distributed with mean zero, Eq. (1) can 
be estimated using a probit model.
We consider as control variables for the final model only 
those variables in Table 4 which fulfil two criteria. The 
first is to decrease the Akaike information criterion (AIC) 
[41] and the second is to be statistically significant at the 
10% level. These criteria ensure that the selected variables 
improve the model’s goodness of fit without raising substan-
tially the risk of overfitting. For the degree of dependency, 
only the variable with the highest explanatory power among 
the three mobility, ADL and IADL limitations is included, 
because of the large collinearity existing between them (i.e. 
ρ > 0.6). The selection of covariates is performed in the joint 
regression model with  IC1 as dependent variable (first col-
umn of Table 6). We retain this selection across the other 
models to have a unified specification.
Controls were tested under different forms (linear, binary 
and categorical) and we retained the one improving the 
most the AIC. Alternative specifications including more 
controls were also tested for all regressions. Results did not 
change substantially, validating our method for the selection 
of covariates. Finally, we also investigate the relationship 
between LTC financing and the probability of formal care 
use. In this case, our dependent variable is the formal home 
care utilization variable and LTC financing, informal care 
receipt by family members and the selected controls are used 
as explanatory variables.
Empirical results
The numerical results from the model calibration are pre-
sented in Table 5.
In Italy, public LTC support is found to impact signifi-
cantly and positively informal care ( IC1 ) in the first regres-
sion. The opposite result is found for Spain, where public 
LTC coverage has a significant negative impact on infor-
mal care provided by family members. This result would 
tend to confirm our initial hypothesis that different public 
LTC financing typologies may have a different impact on 
(1)ICji = 훼 + 훽
j
1
LTCi + 훽
j
2
Xi + 휀i,
informal care. On one hand, in Italy, public LTC is charac-
terized by a mixed system consisting of a universal national 
cash benefit granted to severely dependent (the indennità 
d’accompagnamento), complemented by a very heteroge-
neous set of additional cash and in-kind benefits provided 
and regulated at the regional and municipal levels. On the 
other hand, in Spain, while either in-kind or financial ben-
efits are also granted to moderately dependent, they depend 
on formal care consumption. Hence, in Spain, benefits are 
received conditionally on the receipt of formal care which is 
likely to provide disincentives for informal care. This does 
not necessarily happen in Italy where cash benefits, the most 
important pillar of public LTC support, are not conditioned 
on the receipt of formal care and have more strict eligibility 
criteria. In Italy, cash benefits can be used to compensate 
informal caregivers which may explain the positive relation-
ship between public coverage and informal care. Hence, such 
cash benefits would fulfil their initial role thought to support 
informal caregivers [23]. These first findings would tend to 
support the hypothesis of LTC public support decreasing the 
receipt of informal care for Spain but would reject it for Italy.
Regarding the effect of private LTC insurance on informal 
care, its effect is positive for Italy and negative for Spain, 
but not significant at the relevant levels (p value of 12.3% in 
Italy and 13.3% in Spain). Private insurance, whose indem-
nities take the form of cash benefits, seems to complement 
the public LTC financing system in place. This could explain 
why the coefficient corresponding to this variable has the 
same sign as the one of public LTC coverage. For instance, 
the negative relationship in Spain could be explained by the 
fact that private benefits complement the public system and 
are used to finance co-payments and/or additional formal 
care costs not fully covered by public benefits.
When informal care is defined only in terms of help with 
ADL or with IADL (second and third columns in Table 5), 
our results do not importantly change. When care is defined 
as informal care for IADL, the main difference is that the 
effect of private LTC insurance becomes statistically sig-
nificant at the 10% level in both countries. Additionally, 
the estimate corresponding to public LTC suffers from an 
important reduction in Spain when informal care is defined 
as help with ADL. As help with ADL is a more intense form 
of care, this result is consistent with the findings of Bonsang 
[12] and Bolin [11] showing that formal and informal care 
are weaker substitutes if the intensity of care is high.
In the fourth column, we run a regression with the gen-
eral definition of informal care as the dependent variable 
by additionally controlling for the individual’s net assets 
including housing wealth. More specifically, we include 
three dummies related to the country-specific quartiles 
of the sample wealth distribution. When including this 
variable, the sample size is substantially reduced due to 
the presence of missing values. Our results show that the 
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coefficients corresponding to public LTC benefits do not 
suffer relevant changes, whereas those corresponding to 
private LTC insurance are reduced and become non-sig-
nificant. Furthermore, we find that wealth has a non-linear 
effect on informal care.
The fifth set of results contains the regression models 
using formal care as dependent variable. As laid out above, 
we control for informal care receipt and for the rest of the 
variables except wealth (results do not change when we 
include it). As suspected, in Spain, where public LTC sup-
port is conditioned to formal care receipt, we find a positive 
association between LTC coverage, both public and private, 
and formal home care. In Italy, where the system is mixed, 
we find as well public and private LTC coverage to be pos-
itively associated with formal home care. Hence, on one 
hand, in Spain, LTC public benefits increase formal care and 
decrease informal care. On the other hand, in Italy, LTC pub-
lic benefits increase both formal and informal care receipt.
Concerning the rest of the control variables, formal care 
is not significantly correlated with informal care in Italy, 
while it is significantly positively correlated with the three 
categories of informal care in Spain. A causal interpreta-
tion for this control variable’s marginal effect is beyond the 
scope of this paper. Indeed, we include formal care utilisa-
tion in the regression as an independent variable to control 
for the effects of public support and private insurance in both 
countries by formal home care availability. Having been in 
the hospital is significantly and positively associated with 
the three categories of informal care as well as with formal 
care. The number of IADL limitations is positively and sig-
nificantly related to the receipt of both informal and formal 
care and a better health has the opposite effect on both vari-
ables. The number of members in the respondent’s house-
hold has a very significant increasing negative effect on both 
informal care from outside the household and formal care. 
The remaining variables proxying co-residential informal 
care (i.e. the marital status or having a co-resident child or 
caregiver) are not included as they become non-significant 
once we control by Household Members. Having a daughter, 
which can be considered as a proxy of informal care supply 
[12], is significantly positively related to the probability of 
receiving informal care from outside the household. Age is 
positively and strongly related with having received both 
informal and formal care, with the exception of informal 
care for ADL in Spain (p value of 0.102). In most cases, 
being a woman cannot be significantly related with care 
receipt. Finally, individuals speaking Catalan are less likely 
to receive informal care from a family member living outside 
the household and more likely to receive formal care than 
the rest of Spaniards.
We also computed the correlation matrix between inde-
pendent variables and performed variance inflation factor 
(VIF) checks on all regressions. No major correlations or De
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high values on these tests were found, indicating the absence 
of major multicollinearity.
Joint regressions
In this subsection, we check if the differences found between 
Italy and Spain in the effects of LTC financing on informal 
care receipt by family members from outside the household 
are statistically significant in addition of having different 
signs. To do so, we run the regressions of Table 5 where 
informal care is the dependent variable without splitting the 
data in two country samples. We include a country dummy 
for Italy and the interactions LTCI public*Italy and LTCI 
private*Italy. We remove the dummy variable Catalan as 
we focus on the international differences. The results of this 
model are displayed in Table 6.
The effect of public LTC coverage in Spain is still signifi-
cant at the 1% level when informal care is defined in gen-
eral (columns 1 and 4) and as help with IADL (column 3). 
When informal care is defined as help with ADL, the effect 
of public LTC coverage is reduced substantially and the 
negative effect in Spain is only significant at the 10% level, 
which is consistent with the previous section’s findings, i.e. 
the effect of public LTC coverage is lower when informal 
care is defined as help with ADL. Concerning private LTC 
insurance, the results found previously are maintained as 
the effect of this variable is negative and not significant in 
general.
Looking at the country dummy, we find, as in the descrip-
tive statistics, that despite the important differences between 
the Italian and Spanish public LTC systems, there are virtu-
ally no differences in the probability of receiving informal 
care. The country dummy is not significant in any case.
Considering the interaction LTCI public*Italy, our pre-
viously observed differences hold and are even found to be 
highly significant whatever the definition of informal care 
used. Concerning the effect of private LTC insurance own-
ership, differences are significant at the 5% level only when 
Table 6  Empirical results of the joint regression models for informal care
Dependent variables in the first row
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The significance levels of the two-tailed hypothesis test are coded as follows: *significance at 
10% level, **significance at 5% level, ***significance at 1% level
a Mc. Fadden’s pseudo R
Informal care ( IC1) Informal care ADL ( IC2) Informal care IADL 
(
IC
3
)
Informal care ( IC1)
(Intercept) −1.554∗∗∗ (0.244) −3.148∗∗∗ (0.282) −1.691∗∗∗ (0.249) − 1.346∗∗∗ (0.257)
LTCI public −0.363∗∗∗ (0.081) −0.178∗ (0.100) −0.370∗∗∗ (0.083) −0.420∗∗∗ (0.090)
LTCI private −0.315 (0.221) −0.111 (0.271) −0.373 (0.235) −0.242 (0.241)
Formal care 0.243∗∗∗ (0.065) 0.140∗ (0.079) 0.210∗∗∗ (0.066) 0.270∗∗∗ (0.072)
Hospital 0.157∗∗∗ (0.060) 0.235∗∗∗ (0.073) 0.131∗ (0.061) 0.166∗∗ (0.065)
IADL limitations 0.096∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.145∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.094∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.095∗∗∗ (0.012)
Health −0.182∗∗∗ (0.033) −0.214∗∗∗ (0.046) −0.173∗∗∗ (0.033) −0.216∗∗∗ (0.036)
HH members
 2 −0.429∗∗∗ (0.061) −0.317∗∗∗ (0.080) −0.455∗∗∗ (0.062) −0.414∗∗∗ (0.067)
 3 −0.632∗∗∗ (0.084) −0.475∗∗∗ (0.112) −0.631∗∗∗ (0.086) −0.611∗∗∗ (0.093)
 4 or more −0.789∗∗∗ (0.110) −0.532∗∗∗ (0.142) −0.759∗∗∗ (0.112) −0.791∗∗∗ (0.125)
 N children 0.054∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.046∗∗ (0.022) 0.045∗∗ (0.018) 0.045∗∗ (0.019)
 Has daughter 0.256∗∗∗ (0.060) 0.303∗∗∗ (0.083) 0.249∗∗∗ (0.062) 0.308∗∗∗ (0.067)
 Age 0.011∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.010∗∗ (0.004) 0.013∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.010∗∗∗ (0.003)
Female 0.095∗ (0.052) 0.068 (0.069) 0.122∗∗ (0.053) 0.070 (0.057)
Urban −0.160∗∗∗ (0.051) −0.069 (0.067) −0.196∗∗∗ (0.051) −0.204∗∗∗ (0.056)
Wealth quartiles
 2nd – – – 0.128∗ (0.071)
 3rd – – – −0.203∗∗∗(0.075)
 4th – – – −0.101 (0.078)
 Italy −0.024 (0.055) −0.049 (0.074) −0.030 (0.056) −0.043 (0.061)
 Italy * LTCI public 0.622∗∗∗ (0.123) 0.485∗∗∗ (0.160) 0.653∗∗∗ (0.126) 0.689∗∗∗ (0.134)
 Italy * LTCI private 0.785∗∗ (0.347) 0.273 (0.542) 0.902∗∗∗ (0.356) 0.751∗∗ (0.377)
 Pseudo R2a 15.28% 22.42% 15.08% 16.63%
N 4525 4525 4525 3760
The effect of long‑term care public benefits and insurance on informal care from outside the…
1 3
informal care is defined using the general definition and with 
help for IADL (columns 1, 3 and 4). The differences found 
previously are then robust and economically relevant given 
the significance of these interaction terms.
Finally, regarding the other control variables, no substan-
tial changes are observed.
Robustness
Controlling for regional fixed effects
As stressed earlier, important heterogeneity at the regional 
level is present in the Italian and Spanish public LTC sys-
tems. In Italy, the main public LTC benefit is granted at the 
national level but regions and municipalities also fund addi-
tional forms of cash and in kind public support. In Spain, 
public LTC support is regulated at the national level by the 
law 39/2006 but Autonomous Communities are left with a 
great deal of discretion for determining co-payment rates 
and some characteristics of the benefits granted.
To address such heterogeneity, we again run a selection 
of the regressions of Table 5 and include a set of binary con-
trol variables corresponding to the regions in Italy and the 
Autonomous Communities in Spain. In Table 7, we report 
the coefficients corresponding to public and private LTC 
coverage. We do not estimate the model where wealth is 
included as a control as this alternative specification does 
not substantially affect the coefficients corresponding to pub-
lic and private LTC coverage (see Table 5).
The inclusion of regional fixed effects does not substan-
tially change the results reported in Table 5. The coefficients 
corresponding to public LTC coverage keep the same sign 
and increase their significance, despite that the sample is 
slightly reduced due to missing observations (missing 
regional information). The coefficients corresponding to the 
effect of private LTC insurance ownership keep the same 
sign but are non-significant at the usual confidence levels in 
all models. Finally, we also find that regional fixed effects 
are important determinants of informal care supply in both 
samples as pseudo R2 are larger in all regressions.
Eligibility criteria
As a way to make sure that those who declare in the sur-
vey to have LTC coverage, either public or private, receive 
indeed an indemnity, we decide in the following to only 
consider those individuals who are strongly dependent and 
declare to have two or more ADL limitations. By consider-
ing the subsamples for Italy and Spain, we focus on those 
individuals who are most likely to be eligible for LTC ben-
efits since by definition of the eligibility criteria only those 
with a high degree of dependency are eligible for LTC ben-
efits. Our choice of the criterion having two or more ADL 
limitations is based on the Spanish public LTC benefits eli-
gibility rule as laid out in Section “LTC financing in Italy 
and Spain”. This criterion is also in line with the practice 
of other European countries having a public LTC insurance 
scheme such as France [42] and Germany [43].
Table 8 shows the results of the different regressions 
with the selected subsamples. From the model specifica-
tion, we removed the formal care, hospital, health and 
demographic control variables as well as wealth follow-
ing the Bayesian information criterion (BIC)4 [41], with 
Table 7  Probit regression models controlling for regional fixed effects
Dependent variables in the first row
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The significance levels of the two-tailed hypothesis test are coded as follows: * significance 
at 10% level, ** significance at 5% level, *** significance at 1% level
a Control variables used in Section “Empirical results” excluding wealth
b Regional binary variables based on the NUTS 2 classification (Regions for Italy and Autonomous Communities for Spain)
c Mc. Fadden’s pseudo R2
Informal care ( IC1) Informal care ADL ( IC2) Informal care IADL 
(
IC
3
)
Italy Spain Italy Spain Italy Spain
(Intercept) −2.020∗∗∗ (0.405) − 1.615∗∗∗ (0.458) −2.270∗∗∗ (0.562) −2.452∗∗∗ (0.666) −2.060∗∗∗ (0.416) − 2.012∗∗∗ (0.475)
LTCI public 0.380∗∗∗ (0.113) − 0.433∗∗∗ (0.099) 0.373∗∗ (0.157) − 0.243∗∗ (0.121) 0.423∗∗∗ (0.114) − 0.453∗∗∗ (0.102)
LTCI private 0.153 (0.358) −0.192 (0.249) −3.449 (100.738) −0.152 (0.315) 0.239 (0.361) −0.238 (0.270)
Controls (excl. wealth)a Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional  dummiesb Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2c 14.57% 22.97% 23.76% 27.70% 15.12% 22.91%
N 1903 2′029 1903 2029 1903 2029
4 The BIC is used as, compared to the AIC, it penalizes more those 
models with a large number of parameters.
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the objective of maximizing the degrees of freedom of this 
second econometric estimation given the reduced number 
of observations in the subsamples.
The results of this second set of regressions confirm 
the findings of the previous section. In Italy, we observe 
a significantly positive effect of public LTC coverage on 
informal care across all three categories of informal care 
while in Spain, this relationship is consistently negative. 
Regarding private insurance, we obtain a non-significant 
negative effect on the probability of receiving informal 
care in Spain. Note that in Italy, we could not include 
this variable in the regression analysis as no individuals 
declaring to own private LTC insurance remained in the 
subsample. In the regression with the pooled sample, the 
effects of public LTCI and the interaction are maintained 
and the country dummy is negative and highly significant, 
showing that the probability of receiving care for this sub-
group of population is higher in Spain.
In addition, we find that the marginal effects of public 
LTC coverage on the probability of receiving informal care 
and their significance levels are larger than in the previous 
section in both countries despite the sharp reduction in 
the sample size. Regarding the control variables, with the 
exception of the number of IADL limitations, coefficients 
are larger in absolute value but no changes in their sign 
are observed.
Bootstrapping the empirical coefficients’ 
distribution
We further control the robustness of our results using the 
bootstrap method. The bootstrapping technique, pioneered 
by Efron [44], consists of a Monte-Carlo simulation ran-
domly drawing a large number of samples from the original 
set of observations, running the regression model and com-
puting the distribution statistics of the obtained regression 
coefficients. This makes it possible to estimate the empirical 
distribution of a given estimator (or set of estimators) with 
the objective of checking the robustness of the analytical 
approximation of its values and confidence intervals. Since 
we work with a non-linear model (i.e. a probit model) and 
relatively small sample sizes, our context is propitious for 
the use of such resampling techniques [45].
For each country, we start by selecting 5000 random sam-
ples from the initial data. The number of observations in 
each of these samples corresponds to the size of the origi-
nal dataset, i.e. 2181 observations for Italy and 2344 for 
Spain. Note that in random sampling, a same individual can 
be selected twice (i.e. sampling with replacement). Using 
Table 8  Probit regression models on a subsample of individuals with two or more ADL limitations
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses
* Significance at 10% level, **significance at 5% level, ***significance at 1% level
a Mc. Fadden’s pseudo R2
Informal care ( IC1) Informal care ADL ( IC2) Informal care IADL 
(
IC
3
) Informal care 
( IC1)
Italy Spain Italy Spain Italy Spain Pooled sample
(Intercept) −0.912∗∗∗(0.256) −0.689∗∗∗(0.248) −1.199∗∗∗(0.272) −0.978∗∗∗(0.257) −1.075∗∗∗(0.266) −0.748∗∗∗(0.251) −0.679∗∗∗(0.188)
LTCI public 0.725∗∗∗(0.261) −0.706∗∗∗(0.168) 0.665∗∗(0.266) −0.584∗∗∗(0.174) 0.731∗∗∗(0.263) −0.756∗∗∗(0.173) −0.613∗∗∗(0.163)
LTCI private – −0.613(0.460) – −0.396 (0.457) – −0.537(0.462) –
IADL limita-
tions
0.072∗∗(0.028) 0.096∗∗∗(0.025) 0.082∗∗∗(0.030) 0.103∗∗∗(0.026) 0.068∗∗(0.029) 0.102∗∗∗(0.026) 0.086∗∗∗(0.018)
HH members
 2 −0.550∗∗∗(0.206) −0.507∗∗∗(0.207) −0.533∗∗(0.212) −0.497∗∗(0.207) −0.554∗∗∗(0.209) −0.613∗∗∗(0.208) −0.532∗∗∗(0.144)
 3 −0.914∗∗∗(0.277) −0.958∗∗∗(0.257) −0.991∗∗∗(0.298) −0.929∗∗∗(0.265) −1.040∗∗∗(0.293) −0.901∗∗∗(0.257) −0.959∗∗∗(0.186)
 4 or more −1.325∗∗∗(0.388) −1.539∗∗∗(0.363) −1.132∗∗∗(0.391) −1.252∗∗∗(0.360) −1.268∗∗∗(0.391) −1.483∗∗(0.363) −1.495∗∗(0.263)
 N children 0.081(0.064) 0.091∗∗(0.039) 0.124(0.066) 0.093∗∗(0.039) 0.086(0.065) 0.091∗∗(0.039) 0.097∗∗∗(0.033)
Has daughter 0.371∗(0.216) 0.533∗∗∗(0.189) 0.262(0.227) 0.437∗∗∗(0.197) 0.509∗∗(0.226) 0.509∗∗∗(0.193) 0.458∗∗∗(0.139)
 Catalan – −0.571∗∗(0.248) – −0.503∗∗(0.262) – −0.569∗∗(0.253) –
 Italy – – – – – – −0.398∗∗∗(0.310)
 Italy * LTCI 
public
– – – – – – 1.363∗∗∗(0.310)
 Pseudo R2a 11.55%– 17.45% 12.02% 15.00% 12.81% 16.97% 14.26%
N 267 368 267 368 267 368 635
The effect of long‑term care public benefits and insurance on informal care from outside the…
1 3
the generated samples, the different probit models defined 
in Section “Empirical results” are estimated. As in Sec-
tion “Controlling for regional fixed effects”, we do not esti-
mate the model that includes wealth. This way, we obtain 
5000 sets of the bootstrapped estimates. From these esti-
mates, it is straightforward to extract their expected values 
and confidence intervals.
In Table 9, we first present the results of the bootstrap-
ping for the parameters defining LTC coverage ownership in 
Italy. We provide the simulated coefficients’ two-tailed 95% 
confidence intervals and mean values.
In Italy, we observe that the 95%-confidence intervals of 
the parameters corresponding to public LTC coverage do 
not include zero (no sign change) which allows us to con-
clude on the robustness of the positive effect of public LTC 
financing on informal care. Moreover, the expected values 
of public LTC parameters are very close to the parameter 
estimates presented in Table 5. Therefore, the hypothesis 
that public support crowds out informal care is still rejected 
for Italy in the case of public LTC financing.
The bounds of the confidence intervals surrounding the 
estimates corresponding to private LTC insurance are of 
opposite signs making it impossible to judge on the trend 
of the marginal effect. Thus, no valid conclusions can be 
extracted for this parameter following the bootstrap exer-
cise. Table 10 presents the results of the bootstrapping for 
the parameters defining LTC insurance ownership in Spain. 
In the case of the coefficients corresponding to public LTC 
coverage in Spain, the 95%-confidence intervals are below 
zero for all types of informal care, underlining the consist-
ently negative sign of these estimates. Additionally, as in 
the Italian case, no relevant differences between the simu-
lated expected values and the parameters reported in Sec-
tion “Econometric analysis” are noticed and in any of these 
three cases. Therefore, the bootstrap results support the 
hypothesis that public support decreases informal care in 
the Spanish public LTC system.
The 95% confidence intervals of the coefficients corre-
sponding to private LTC insurance contain both, negative 
and positive values, and thus no valid conclusions for these 
marginal effects can be extracted.
Conclusion
This article uses cross-sectional data from the sixth wave 
of the SHARE survey to test the effect of both LTC pub-
lic benefits and private insurance on the receipt of infor-
mal care by non-co-resident family members in Italy and 
Spain.
The choice of Italy and Spain comes from the fact that 
informal care is rather similar in these two countries while 
their respective public LTC financing systems are rather 
different. Indeed, on one hand, these two Southern Euro-
pean countries are considered as “strong family ties coun-
tries” and, therefore, are rather similar in terms of family 
values with family members representing the main source 
of informal care. On the other hand, the nature of pub-
lic benefits is very different, proportional to formal care 
expenses in Spain, and mainly in the form of cash benefits 
independent of formal care expenditures in Italy.
We consider three categories of informal care and dis-
sociate informal care for ADL from informal care for 
IADL, as these two kinds of care can be provided for dif-
ferent reasons and then be influenced to a different extend 
by insurance.
Our results support the hypothesis of LTC public cov-
erage decreasing informal care for Spain. However, for 
Italy, we find a consistent positive and significant relation-
ship between LTC public coverage and the probability of 
receiving informal care by non-co-resident family mem-
bers. Regarding the effect of private LTC insurance on 
informal care, we also find significant opposite results for 
the two countries except when informal care is defined as 
Table 9  The 95% confidence 
intervals and expected values 
of the LTCI public and private 
parameters in Italy
Informal care ( IC1) Informal care ADL ( IC2) Informal care IADL
(IC3)
LTCI public [0.045|0.406]
0.233
[0.035|0.534]
0.290
[0.073|0.435]
0.258
LTCI private [– 0.274|0.856]
0.370
[– 3.863|0.874]
1.080
[– 0.217|0.925]
0.435
Table 10  The 95% confidence 
intervals and expected values 
of the LTCI public and private 
parameters in Spain
Informal care ( IC1) Informal care ADL ( IC2) Informal care IADL
(IC3)
LTCI public [– 0.621|0.276]
0.443
[– 0.436|0.019]
0.222
[– 0.627|0.272]
0.444
LTCI private [– 0.913|0.075]
0.370
[– 1.002|0.396]
0.211
[– 0.997|0.004]
0.442
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informal care for ADL. In that case, private LTC insurance 
positively impacts informal care in Italy and negatively 
in Spain.
These results tend to confirm that the effect of public 
benefits on informal care is influenced by the typology 
of public LTC coverage. In Spain, benefits, either in kind 
or financial, depend on the consumption of formal care. 
Hence, benefits are received only if formal care is con-
sumed. The use of formal care is, therefore, encouraged, 
thus providing much less incentives to offer informal care.
In Italy, public benefits are mainly in the form of cash 
benefits independent of formal care expenses, complemented 
by additional regional and municipal LTC services. There-
fore, LTC benefits are not necessarily linked to formal care 
consumption as it happens in Spain. The positive relation-
ship between LTC public coverage and informal care in Italy 
seems to be explained by the fact that cash benefits can be 
used to directly provide financial compensation or incen-
tives to informal caregivers. Hence, such cash benefits fulfil 
their initial role which was thought as a measure to support 
informal caregivers [23].
Our results also show that in both countries, private LTC 
insurance, whose benefits are cash and fixed, seems to com-
plement the public LTC financing system in place. This 
could explain why the direction of the marginal effect of 
private insurance on informal care follows the one of pub-
lic LTC coverage and the positive sign of the interaction 
term in Section “Joint regressions”. A deeper analysis on 
the potential complementary role of private LTC insurance 
with public LTC programs can be an interesting topic for 
future research.
There are several limitations to this study that need to be 
pointed out. First, our results apply to informal care provided 
by family members living outside the household and not to 
informal care received by co-resident and other caregivers 
such as neighbours and friends. Yet, we focus on the most 
common type of informal care according to our data and 
including alternative forms of informal care in the depend-
ent variable would come at the cost of an increase in the 
main estimates’ heterogeneity, making them more difficult 
to interpret. The second limitation concerns the fact that 
LTC benefits in Italy are restricted to severely dependent 
individuals while in Spain, they can cover those moderately 
limited as well. While we partially control for this difference, 
the degree of needs differently impacts eligibility criteria in 
Spain and Italy, and could influence the relationship between 
informal care and LTC coverage. A third limitation is that 
children altruism could justify the positive relationship 
between LTC coverage and informal care found in Italy as 
it increases the marginal benefit of supplying care and even 
to a higher extent in the presence of LTC coverage (Bascans 
et al. [16], Klimaviciute [13]). However, we are unable to 
control for this phenomenon with our data.
To conclude, whether a LTC system is more or less prone 
to influence, positively or negatively, informal care might 
lead to different economic policies. According to our results, 
a model similar to the Italian public system mainly based on 
fixed benefits would provide few disincentives, even any, 
to informal care givers. This would help to attenuate LTC 
expenditures’ increases. While, a model similar to the Span-
ish public system with proportional benefits provides disin-
centives to informal caregivers and then could be socially 
beneficial by reducing the burden of caregiving in terms of 
health and lower employment participation. Further research 
on these issues and for other countries should be developed 
to generalise our results.
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